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That WM correlates positively with gF is not controversial.
What is under debate is the mechanism for this correlation.
Research suggests that one common link is prefrontal cortex
(PFC) functioning (Kane & Engle 2002). For example, human
and nonhuman primate studies find significantly reduced WM
task performance with PFC lesions that are not observed with
more posterior lesions (Kane & Engle 2002). Similarly, patients
with PFC lesions demonstrate a marked deficit in gF-loaded
task performance compared to healthy controls (Duncan et al.
1995).
To be specific, our view is that differential functioning of the
PFC brings about individual differences in executive attention
control. According to our view, this general attention ability
should reveal itself not only in high-level cognitive tasks such
as those designed to measure gF, but also in fairly low-level
tasks, provided that the task requires effortful attention control.
In one of the most striking examples of this, Kane et al. (2001)
(see also Unsworth et al. 2004) found that individuals high in
WM capacity (“high spans”) performed better than those low
in WM capacity (“low spans”) in a selective orienting task.
Specifically, in the antisaccade condition, subjects had to resist
reflexive orienting toward a flashing cue and instead execute a
saccade in the opposite direction. Low span subjects committed
more errors, and, even when their saccade was in the correct
direction, they were slower to do so. This result stands in contrast
to performance in the prosaccade condition, where both high and
low WM span subjects were equally able to orient toward the
flashing cue.
In another such low-level task, Heitz and Engle (submitted)
had subjects perform the Eriksen flanker paradigm. Subjects
were to respond with one hand if the center letter was H and
with the other hand if the center letter was S. On compatible
trials, all the letters were identical (e.g., SSSSS). However, on
incompatible trials, the center letter was surrounded by
response-incompatible letters (e.g., SSHSS). Thus, to perform
this task effectively, subjects had to focus their attention (for
example, by constraining their attentional allocation) on the
center letter in an effort to filter the surrounding distractor
letters. Heitz and Engle (submitted) found that low spans were
slower to perform this visual-attention filtering than were high
spans. Again, no span differences were evident in the compatible
trials, when attentional constraint was unnecessary.
These low-level tasks, though unrelated on their surface to tra-
ditional WM-span tasks such as reading span, reliably dissociate
low and high WM span participants. This, along with our struc-
tural equation modeling studies, suggest that what is important
for high-level and low-level cognitive functioning is the ability
to control attention, whether this serves the purpose of filtering
distractor letters in the visual field or maintaining a list of
letters in a distracting environment. Although we do not yet
know exactly how this is important for fluid intelligence, the
strong relationship between WM and gF, as well as a shared
reliance on the PFC, support a view implicating attentional
control. Our continued efforts are directed at examining this
issue in detail.
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Abstract: Blair presumes the validity of the fluid-crystallized model
throughout his article. Two comparative evaluations recently demon-
strated that this presumption can be challenged. The fluid-crystallized
model offers little to the understanding of the structural manifestation
of general intelligence and other more specific abilities. It obscures
important issues involving the distinction of pervasive learning disabilities
(low general intelligence) from specific, content-related disabilities that
impede the development of particular skills.
The dominant theoretical model of the structure of human intel-
lect in the psychometric tradition is based on the theory of fluid
and crystallized intelligence. Developed initially by Cattell (1943;
1963) and elaborated in greater detail by Horn (1976; 1985;
1998), the theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence dis-
tinguishes these two abilities. Fluid ability is demonstrated by
solving problems for which prior experience and learned know-
ledge are of little use. It is measured best by tests having little
scholastic or cultural content, such as verbal tasks that rely on
relationships among familiar words, or perceptual and figural
tasks. Crystallized ability reflects consolidated knowledge
gained by education, access to cultural information, and experi-
ence. An individual’s crystallized ability originates with fluid
ability but is developed through access to and selection of learn-
ing experiences. Consequently, among people of similar edu-
cational and cultural background, individual differences in fluid
ability are thought to influence individual differences in crystal-
lized ability. Yet, persons from different cultural backgrounds
with the same level of fluid ability are predicted to differ in crys-
tallized ability. This is the theoretical basis for arguing that many
intelligence tests are culturally biased.
As conceived initially, fluid-crystallized theory was used to
argue against the existence of general intelligence (Cattell
1971; Horn 1989), based on the belief that the higher-order
general intelligence factors arising from different batteries of
tests would vary. For three widely known test batteries,
however, this belief was unfounded (Johnson et al. 2004). In
more recent years, Carroll’s (1993) monumental and systematic
exploratory factor analysis of more than 460 data sets has built
some consensus around a three-strata hierarchical model with
general intelligence at the highest stratum, and fluid and crystal-
lized abilities prominent among the more specialized abilities in
the second stratum. This model effectively synthesizes the ideas
of intelligence researchers over the past 100 years.
Blair’s creative synthesis makes clear that the descriptive accu-
racy of this model has been presumed in designing studies
spanning the domains of psychology, as well as in designing
intelligence assessment tools. It is also assumed by Blair. Surpris-
ingly, received wisdom has not been subject to empirical scrutiny
in the form of comparative assessment, despite the existence of
other models for the structure of intellect. Two comparative
evaluations using modern confirmatory factor-analytic tech-
niques, however, demonstrated clearly that the fluid-crystallized
model provides an inaccurate description of the structure of
human intellect (Johnson & Bouchard 2005; in press). Vernon’s
(1964; 1965) more content-based verbal-perceptual model pro-
vides greater descriptive accuracy, which is further enhanced
by the addition of a factor representing image rotation.
The fluid-crystallized model as extended by Carroll (1993)
differs from the Vernon (1964; 1965) model in the definitions
of the concepts of fluid and crystallized intelligence and verbal
and perceptual abilities. Clarity about these definitions is compli-
cated by the fact that many researchers have tended to conflate
fluid intelligence with perceptual abilities, and crystallized intel-
ligence with verbal abilities. The two sets of terms do overlap to a
substantial degree, but they can also be distinguished in a
straightforward way. As noted, learned knowledge and skill con-
tribute little to manifestations of fluid intelligence but extensively
to manifestations of crystallized intelligence. Both Cattell (1971)
and Horn (1989) were clear that this distinction in the role of
experience applies across content boundaries. In contrast,
Vernon’s verbal and perceptual abilities follow content areas.
Thus, tests involving the explicit use of pre-existing perceptual
knowledge would contribute to crystallized intelligence, but not
to verbal ability. Further, tests that involve abstract reasoning
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with factual knowledge would contribute to both fluid and
crystallized intelligence, but such tests would not contribute to
perceptual ability. The structure of ability follows the verbal-
perceptual outline rather than the fluid-crystallized outline
(Johnson & Bouchard 2005; in press), rendering the controversy
surrounding the question of the equivalence of fluid and general
intelligence moot.
Psychometric models of the structure of intellectual ability
offer objective and rigorous frameworks for studying genetic
(Gottesman 1997; Plomin & Craig, in press) and epigenetically
mediated neurobiological endophenotypes and processes
(Gottesman & Gould 2003; Weaver et al. 2004), as well as
insight into the relative accuracy of the measurement tools we
use to assess the ability of individuals and to predict their
success in educational and occupational domains. The research
Blair describes highlights the limitations of the fluid-crystallized
model in addressing these purposes. Paper-and-pencil tests of
ability are blunt measurement tools. Performance on any task
always reflects learned behavior to at least some degree. People
also likely differ in their prior exposure to any task as much as
they do in innate ability to address any truly novel task. Conse-
quently, it is never possible to measure innate ability per se,
and there is always variance in the degree to which innate
ability is reflected in individual test scores. In addition, most pro-
blems can be solved using multiple strategies, making it difficult
to be sure that any specific task measures any specific ability.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the variance common to even a rela-
tively small battery of such tests taps a general intellectual ability
with substantial relevance to a wide variety of life outcomes
(Gottfredson 1997; Jensen 1998; Lubinski 2004). Blair raises
important questions related to the biological development of
this general ability in the context of emotional regulation and
environmental stress, but we will be able to address these ques-
tions more fruitfully by separating the process of development
from the structures developed.
Jensen (1998, p. 95) nicely distinguished between processes
and structures in their implications for understanding intellectual
performance. We may be able to use fluid-crystallized theory to
understand how intellectual performance emerges in the individ-
ual, but understanding the structural manifestation of general
intelligence and other more specific abilities requires comparison
across individuals in a systems biology context (Grant 2003).
Fluid-crystallized theory has little to offer in this regard. It may
even delay the resolution of important issues involving the dis-
tinction of pervasive learning disabilities (low general intelli-
gence) from specific, content-related disabilities that impede
the development of particular skills. These specific disabilities
also tend to follow Vernon’s (1965) hierarchical structure of
general intelligence supplemented with specific verbal and per-
ceptual abilities, further supplemented with image-rotation
ability.
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Abstract: Blair makes a strong case that fluid cognition and psychometric
g are not identical constructs. However, he fails to mention the
development of the prefrontal cortex, which likely makes the Gf–g
distinction different in children than in adults.1 He also incorrectly
states that current IQ tests do not measure Gf; we discuss several
recent instruments that measure Gf quite well.
Blair’s target article makes a strong case that fluid cognition and
psychometric g are not identical constructs. Indeed, these con-
structs are clearly dissimilar for adults, a notion supported for
years by a wealth of aging research generated by Horn and
Cattell’s (1966) constructs of fluid (Gf)1 and crystallized (Gc)
intelligence. Dramatically different growth curves have been
demonstrated for Gf and Gc across the adult life span for numer-
ous adult tests (e.g., Kaufman 2001). Blair includes aging
research on the Horn-Cattell constructs as one piece of evidence
for the distinctiveness of Gf and g, and we agree that this one
argument, per se, is stronger than any factor-analytically based
psychometric argument that Gf and g are virtual identities.
Blair’s evidence for the distinctions between Gf and g for chil-
dren, though strongly reasoned and diverse in its breadth, is less
compelling than the evidence for adults. Blair appropriately dis-
cusses the key role played by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in fluid
cognitive functions, but fails to mention or consider the develop-
ment of these functions in children. As Golden (1981) indicates,
it is not until about ages 11–12, on average, that “the prefrontal
areas of the brain that serve as the tertiary level of the output/
planning unit develop” (p. 292). This level corresponds to the
onset of Piaget’s stage of formal operations (Inhelder & Piaget
1958) and the emergence of Luria’s (1970) Block 3 planning
abilities.
The identification of Gf factors in groups of normal children
also has a distinct developmental component. These factors do
not emerge as separate constructs until about age 6 or 7
(Elliott 1990; Kaufman & Kaufman 2004). Therefore, the
relationship between Gf and g in children is likely to be a differ-
ent phenomenon for children below age 6, for those between 7
and 11, and for adolescents. As multifaceted in scope as Blair’s
analysis was, his conclusions for children should be treated as
tentative pending more thorough developmental analyses.
One other area of Blair’s review that was relatively weak was
his apparent lack of awareness of the contemporary psychometric
scene regarding the assessment of fluid cognition, especially in
children. He cited a 15-year-old source (Woodcock 1990) and
an 8-year-old source (McGrew 1997) to document “the limited
assessment of gF currently available in many widely used intelli-
gence tests” (sect. 4.1, para. 3) and to state that these tests “dis-
proportionately assess crystallized skills and domains of
intelligence associated with opportunity for learning” (sect. 7.1,
para. 2).
Those claims are simply not true. Tests that deemphasized g
and provided measurement of fluid cognition began to be pub-
lished shortly after Woodcock’s (1990) article went to press,
and have proliferated since McGrew’s (1997) chapter was pub-
lished. The latest versions of the Wechsler and Binet tests are
joined by many other well-normed, psychometrically sound, cog-
nitive ability tests that minimize the importance of g, emphasize
the assessment of multiple abilities and measure fluid cognition.
Listed chronologically, the following tests all provide excellent
measurement of fluid cognition:
1. Differential Ability Scales (DAS [Elliott 1990]), 212–17
years; includes three scales for school-age children, one of
which is a Nonverbal Reasoning Scale that measures Gf (Keith
2005).
2. Kaufman Adolescent and Adult Intelligence Test (KAIT
[Kaufman & Kaufman 1993]), 11–85þ years; includes two
scales named Crystallized Intelligence and Fluid Intelligence;
two subtests (Mystery Codes and Logical Steps) are considered
excellent measures of Gf (Flanagan & Ortiz 2001).
3. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd edition (WAIS-III
[Wechsler 1997]), 16–89 years; added a measure of Gf (Matrix
Reasoning) to the Performance Scale, a measure of working
memory (Letter–Number Sequencing), and a separate
Working Memory Index.
4. Cognitive Assessment System (CAS [Naglieri & Das 1997]),
5–17 years; includes four scales derived from Luria’s theory, one
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